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Abstract- This study examines how buyers and 
suppliers balance control and trust to manage 
compliance with corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
requirements in supply chains (SCs). Two in-depth, 
qualitative case studies of the Bangladesh apparel 
industry on two multinational companies of the same 
European country were conducted. This study 
indicates that a buyer’s need for control and trust is 
important in contact with other actors for managing 
CSR compliance. Formal control is found to generate 
competence trust, whereas intentional trust is achieved 
through informal control. Intentional trust is helpful 
for competence and capacity development, but for it to 
continue the supplier needs to fulfill the buyer’s 
expectations. Competence of the supplier is viewed as a 
prerequisite for developing competence trust. This 
study analyzes control and trust to fill an important 
gap in SC theory on relationships by stressing how 
these constructs interact and complement each other to 
manage CSR compliance in apparel industry. Firms 
must focus on a balanced relationship between trust 
and control to manage CSR compliance. Willingness to 
collaborate can only work when supplier competence 
and managerial resources are ensured. This study 
notes that managers need both formal and informal 
control to create competence and intentional trust in 
the supply chains. Capacity building is viewed as a 
complement, not an alternative to CSR compliance. 
With its closer attention to control and trust, this study 
fills an important gap in SC theory on relationships by 
stressing how these constructs interact and 
complement each other for managing CSR compliance 
in supply chains.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is seen as a 
managerial process, with corporations ethically driven to 
meet social and stakeholder obligations [49]. These social 
obligations, which are usually known as CSR compliance, 
have become an important research area in the supply 
chain field [56], [52], [12], [61], [40]. CSR compliance, 
also called “supplier codes,” includes, among other 
operations issues, working conditions that are safe and 
hygienic, absence of child labor, non-excessive hours, and 
workers paid reasonable living wages [35]. There has been 
a long discussion on the implementation and management 
of CSR compliance, particularly in the developing 
countries, raising several questions that need to be 
addressed. Challenges relate mainly to the process of 
compliance management, i.e. how the compliance activity 
is carried out [11] and effectiveness of the 
implementation, i.e. whether the process has been 
successful [68]. Researchers report that compliance 
management has not been satisfactory for several reasons, 
including worker exploitation and use of child labor [60], 
inhuman working conditions [9], low prices [30], shorter 
lead times [22] and one-way initiative by the buyer 
without taking the supplier’s situation into consideration 
[55]. These evidences underscore the need for 
investigation of the compliance process, as also proposed 
by [63]. 
Two streams of SC literature can be traced 
regarding buyer-supplier relationships for CSR 
implementation: one of them focuses on CSR practices 
through the implementation of supplier codes of conduct 
[3], [12], [40]; the other highlights the need for extensive 
collaboration between buyer and supplier together with 
some control efforts [44], [61]. The first stream of SC 
literature has concentrated on governance or control 
mechanisms to transfer CSR practices and behaviors to 
suppliers [25]. This stream assumes power asymmetry 
between buyers and suppliers as the traditional 
relationship for supplier compliance [32], [46].  
The other stream stresses partnerships between 
buyers and suppliers and pays attention to reciprocity and 
the sharing of responsibilities [55]. It is argued that 
partnerships with suppliers have become the lifeblood of 
the SC, and the issue is not whether to build them with 
suppliers or not [43], [66] but how to develop and 
balance trust and control mechanisms. The SC literature 
discusses either of these traditions to deal with socially 
related CSR issues but makes no attempt, to our 
knowledge, to go into the problems in depth or to 
observe how both control and trust-based partnerships 
can coexist in the buyer-supplier relationship [59]. The 
aim of this article is to fill this gap by exploring how 
buyers balance trust and control to manage CSR 
compliance in suppliers’ factories.  
Ref. [52] however, argue that a company’s 
sustainability profile is dependent not only on its direct 
suppliers but also on its extended SC or even the wider 
network in which it operates. By adopting a network ______________________________________________________________ 
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perspective, Ref. [28] emphasize that two roles of the 
partnering firms are required, one related to the 
interactions between buyers and suppliers, the other their 
extended networking with other actors. Trust and control 
are regarded as important properties in the network 
perspective in developing relationships [17]. SC studies 
also stress the importance of long-term relationships 
between buyers and suppliers [6], [10], [13] but do not 
really examine how control mechanisms can be handled in 
the spirit of collaboration.  
Based on the above discussion, this paper argues that 
trust and control in buyer-supplier relationships need to be 
understood in relation to external actors who can affect the 
management of CSR compliance. By focusing on the 
trust-control mechanism, this study addresses one main 
and two sub-questions: 
 How do buyers balance control and trust to 
manage CSR compliance in supplier 
organizations? 
o How do buyers and suppliers interact and 
engage to manage CSR compliance? 
o How do buyers and suppliers interact with 
external actors to manage CSR 
compliance? 
The next section reviews the literature and presents a 
theoretical framework to conduct the study. The 
methodology section discusses the method used and how 
data is collected and analyzed. In the empirical study two 
cases are thoroughly discussed by following the 
theoretical framework. Thereafter the data is analyzed and 
linked with the literature. Finally, we draw conclusions, 
discuss theoretical and managerial implications, and 
suggest further research areas. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
 
In this review, CSR issues and their importance are 
discussed in the SC and particularly in relation to buyers. 
Control and trust are taken up as mechanisms for 
managing CSR compliance. 
 
2.1  CSR Overview 
 
CSR represents the business response to minimizing the 
negative social impact of global business operations [55]. 
In a survey on organizational commitment, Ref. [63] 
observes that employees prefer to work in socially 
responsible organizations and are positively affected by 
CSR issues. Researchers find that activities for sustaining 
strategic CSR are assumed to improve corporate image 
and increase motivation and loyalty, primarily among 
employees and customers but also among others such as 
suppliers and retailers [42], [64]. Ref. [54] argue that 
companies are now evaluated not only on the products 
they sell but also on their CSR practices in the SC. Thus, 
for multinationals it has become important to discern how 
managers deal with the moral aspect of employee issues in 
global SC while working to maximize profits [55].  
 Researchers argue that CSR is achieved when 
socially responsible behaviors go beyond the boundaries 
of a single firm and involve wider communities [48] , [7] , 
[13]. From a network perspective, Ref. [28] also recognize 
that business relationships are not limited to a couple of 
firms or dyads but also link other actors to generate 
resources and support. Thus, involvement of a variety of 
parties can complicate the CSR compliance process, since 
communication can go wrong or the generation of 
important resources may not function as expected. This 
has driven multinational enterprises to consider the risks 
and vulnerabilities, e.g. by designing codes of conduct 
aimed at supplier compliance [39]. 
 CSR studies have discussed different issues in 
relation to managing supplier CSR compliance in global 
SCs. And many of the issues have complicated the process 
of compliance rather than handling it. Ref. [65] identify 
several obstacles, including lack of resources and skills, 
lack of awareness of stakeholders’ demands and 
inefficient production techniques in implementing CSR. 
However, larger firms are in a better position than smaller 
ones to handle these difficulties. The problem of ethical 
conduct in the apparel industry and the complex nature of 
global subcontracting relationships are two issues often 
named in CSR studies in developing countries [45]. There 
is evidence that the CSR literature largely focuses on large 
firms [3], [61], [62], [68] and academic research on small 
firms is scarce. As the current study concern SC 
relationships it focuses on both types of firms to explore 
their situations in implementing CSR compliance. From 
an empirical study, Ref. [22] recognize that the apparel 
industry is characterized by powerful global buyers and 
relatively weak suppliers. Ref. [36] argues that imbalance 
in power can make the relationship unstable, particularly 
on the part of the suppliers. This fact raises the importance 
on how SC buyer-supplier relationships are managed 
based on the need of control or trust. 
  
2.2       Control and trust  
 
Ref. [57] argue that trust and control are vital for a better 
understanding of the possible interactions among context, 
intervention and outcome in the SC network. Trust and 
control are relevant in two ways: (a) in relationships 
between buyers and suppliers and (b) in their relationships 
with other stakeholders, who can particularly influence the 
implementation of CSR issues  
Interdependence gives actors control over each other 
but becomes less important as trust develops between the 
actors [58]. However, control and trust are two important 
concepts that reduce the probability and impact of 
undesirable outcomes [41], [53]. Typically, the level of 
trust in a relationship tends to vary with the control 
mechanisms that are used [51].  
The concept of control refers to the formal 
mechanisms of governance employed in the relationship, 
such as contracts, arrangements for monitoring and the 
exchange of ‘hostages’ [41]. Ref. [51] argues that 
contracts are used as a means of controlling the supplier -
especially when conflicts arise. Contracts can be used to 
specify responsibilities, to limit the spread of information, 
to agree on cost-sharing and on the specification of 
exclusivity periods [5]. Contract as a source of control has 
been criticized in industrial network research [20]. For 
exercising control, maintained is that at least two parties 
are involved in the relationship. A relationship gives each 
firm a certain influence over the other, which means that 
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each firm gains control of at least one part of its 
environment while giving away some of its internal 
control [21].  
Ref. [13] discuss two strategies for CSR 
management in the SC: compliance with suppliers’ 
requirements and capacity building. The first strategy sets 
standards for suppliers and implements exercise of control 
following strict monitoring program. Capacity building, 
on the other hand, aims at building up the supplier’s own 
CSR capacity through long-term trust related 
relationships. From this view, compliance and capacity 
building are two alternatives that compete with each other, 
which means that firms need to make a choice among the 
strategies. We, however, argue that capacity development 
in the supplier organization is essential even when strict 
monitoring is practiced by the buyer.  
Ref. [34] claim that most CSR efforts are targeted at 
monitoring first-tier suppliers while ignoring second-tier 
suppliers or relying on first-tier suppliers’ responsibility 
towards their own suppliers. This kind of secondary trust 
may be practical for cost reduction but requires that the 
first-tier supplier has necessary capacity, proper training 
or interest to develop rules for compliance. Trust has been 
defined as a positive expectation regarding the 
competence or intentions of a partner [41]. Empirical 
evidences indicate that trust is essential for successful SC 
relationships, as it can make the chain more agile and 
responsive [29], [32]. An important question is how 
buyers consider trust and apply it in relation to control in 
managing CSR compliance. 
Two types of trust are commonly identified: 
competence trust and intentional trust [41]. The first 
category expresses the level of trust one has in the 
technical, organizational and managerial competence of a 
trustee [38]. This trust is skill based and argued to develop 
through training and learning [57]. To develop 
competence trust, particularly in a developing country, 
direct involvement of buyers in education are seen as 
necessary to ensure skill development and capacity 
building in the supplier organization. Competence trust 
development is resource dependent, and a buyer who 
provides resources and engages in activities can easier 
exercise control in supplier relationships [19]. There will 
be systematic pressure on the supplier to be in compliance 
and strictly follow the buyer’s standards [13]. Competence 
trust requires formal control that emphasizes the 
establishment and utilization of formal rules, procedures 
and policies to monitor and reward desirable performance 
[19]. Ref. [8] argues that formal control may induce trust 
by offering confidential or unavailable information to 
improve inter-organizational relationships. Intentional 
trust refers to the willingness of a partner to become 
involved in the relationship and to support and develop it. 
Trustees use their ability to conform to a trustor’s 
expectations and do not behave opportunistically [36].  To 
build trust, the partners solve problems through mutuality 
and dialog. Understanding and obligation are the keys, 
while social (informal) control plays a vital role when 
formal control is absent. Ref. [8] introduced the concept of 
social control when other control mechanisms did not 
function. Intentional trust induces social control and vice 
versa. Organizations commonly sign an initial contract 
with SC parties to avoid unpleasant surprises. This view is 
close to the complementary perspective, which suggests 
that trust and control are mutually reinforcing when it 
comes to combatting risk [58].  
 
2.3        Networking 
 
The logic and dynamics of network relationships can be 
understood and analyzed by identifying critical actors, 
activities and resources.  [14]. Actors, are analyzed due to 
their role as having certain roles that allow recognizing 
critical issues of the network. They have also own goals 
and perceptions of the interacting parties’ activity pattern 
necessary to understand [28]. Resources include goods 
and services, manufacturing facilities, finance, 
technology, knowledge and personnel that companies 
develop and share [1]. In the case of employee-related 
CSR implementation in developing countries, the question 
of who will pay the cost is often an unresolved issue. By 
increasing their understanding of suppliers’ conditions, 
buyers can make better use of own resources invested in 
the relationships, as well as activate and utilize the 
suppliers’ resources for mutual benefit [24]. However, 
business relationships are more than the sum of their parts; 
their effects are transmitted along complex threads that 
stretch across the business landscape [27].  Complexity 
contributes to supply chain relationship uncertainty 
making it difficult to assess external actors’ impact on 
CSR management in SC.  
A distinction between primary and secondary 
functions of business relationships can be drawn. The 
primary functions work to gain efficiency through 
interlinking of activities, creative leveraging of resource 
heterogeneity, and mutuality based on the self-interest of 
actors. The activities are carried out by two main actors 
(i.e. buyers and suppliers) based on exchange of resources 
for mutual benefit. By combining critical resources, the 
parties gain additional values and advantages [24]. 
Secondary functions arise from the connections between 
relationships. With regard to the three components—
activities, actors and resources—the secondary functions 
concern chains of activities involving more than two 
firms, constellations of resources controlled by more than 
two firms and shared network perceptions by more than 
two firms. The components are interrelated and are the 
cornerstone in developing relationships between buyers 
and suppliers and with other actors in the SC. Ref. [21] 
claim that business networking is not simply the 
implementation of the independent company strategies of 
one or more actors but a continuing interaction between 
interdependent actors, activities and resources. Network 
coordination refers to a chain’s overall structure and the 
control mechanisms that influence the relationships 
involved [17]. From CSR in SC perspective important is 
to consider how buyers and suppliers identify strategic 
important network partners and develop contacts to apply 
control-trust relationships in SCs. 
 
 
2.4 Theoretical framework 
 
The theoretical framework is presented in (Figure 1). 
Depending on the buyer’s dominant role in the buyer-
supplier relationship, control and trust are central 
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mechanisms having influence on the network. Assumed is 
that to manage CSR compliance the buyers have to 
develop strategies on how to exercise control and trust in 
the relationship. Based on the chosen control-trust 
strategy, the partners engage in relationships with 
different actors to acquire the resources needed to manage 
CSR compliance in the SC. Inter-organizational 
researchers found that interdependence between control 
and trust across all levels in organizations affects firms’ 
relational commitments and willingness to develop 
enduring networks [2], [31].  
 
Figure 1. A theoretical framework on managing CSR 
compliance 
 
3. Method 
 
3.1        Choice of method  
 
It is important for the method selected to correspond with 
the aim of the study. Our case study approach follows Ref. 
[67]’s suggestion to answer how and why questions when 
the researcher has little control over events and when the 
focus is on a current phenomenon in a real-life context. 
Ref. [23] has found four advantages to case studies: (1) 
deeper understanding by providing rich descriptions of 
real phenomena, (2) their contextuality, (3) prospect for 
theory building and (4) permitting the investigation of a 
phenomenon from a variety of viewpoints covering a 
period of time and crossing the boundaries between 
different factors. Considering CSR as a complex and 
current issue, this study went into depth in the data 
collection process by combining different data sources to 
investigate how CSR is implemented in a cross-cultural 
setting. More specifically, the case study approach is 
suitable for examining how networks work in different 
settings and contexts [37], [20].  
 This study concerns two cases in Bangladesh, 
involving one large and one small buyer from a European 
country, which we will call Alpha and Beta. Alpha is one 
of the world’s largest apparel firms, while Beta is 
relatively unknown in the world market. Further, Alpha is 
one of the main buyers of local products, while Beta is a 
small player with a limited amount of procurement from 
the local market. These unequal buyers have been chosen 
to observe how trust and control are applied in the buyer-
supplier relationship. A second reason for the choice is 
that both buyers come from the same country with a 
comparable style of managing business relationships. A 
third reason is that both firms are active in the market and 
engaged in collaborating with other actors to manage CSR 
compliance. Finally, these buyers have given us access to 
interview their officials in their home country and 
Bangladesh, as well as to contact their suppliers.  
 Bangladesh was selected for several reasons. First, it 
is the world’s second-largest exporter of apparel after 
China, a status the company achieved within a period of 
around 20 years. Recently, the Bangladesh government 
and garment exporters set a target to export apparel items 
worth US $50 billion by the end of 2021 [15]. Second, 
90% of the employees in the apparel industry are women, 
making the achievement of employee empowerment 
challenging. Third, Bangladesh came to the attention of 
the world’s media in April 2013, when an apparel factory 
in the capital city of Dhaka collapsed, causing the death of 
more than 1000 workers [26]. Fourth, surprisingly even 
after the tragedy, interest in buying from Bangladesh has 
not decreased but instead focuses on the implementation 
of CSR in the factories on the initiative of large foreign 
buyers including Wal-Mart, Gap, H&M, Macy’s, Sears 
and JC Penny.  
For this study, one researcher’s continuous presence 
in Bangladesh kept us updated with the current situation 
and development of the industry. Ref. [16] states that 
qualitative research creates close contacts with the 
respondents and therefore helps in dealing with contextual 
sensitivity and perceptual insight. Theory development 
proceeded by contrasting the existing theory with the 
empirical data and comparing the cases to find 
commonalities and differences. This study utilized the 
advantage of different viewpoints by including workshops 
and discussions with different people from buyers’ and 
suppliers’ firms over a period of two years. 
 
3.2      Data collection 
 
Data was collected mainly through face-to-face interviews 
with first- and second-tier suppliers in Bangladesh. 
Managing directors or general managers of the supplying 
firms were interviewed, since they had the primary 
contacts with buyers and oversaw the implementation of 
CSR in their organizations. The authors did not find any 
manager who deals with CSR specifically. Before the 
interviews, a short description of the research project and 
a list of themes for discussion were sent to the respondents 
via e-mail. A total of 21 people were interviewed in 
Bangladesh and the multinationals’ home country in 
Europe; each interview took between 40 and 120 minutes. 
People responsible for CSR in the buyers’ and the 
suppliers’ companies were interviewed. Further main 
partners involved in the supply chain CSR network were 
contacted and interviewed. This contact net gave us a 
complete view of how the supply chain worked, 
particularly in relation to the implementation of CSR.  A 
detailed overview of the informants and the data 
collection is presented in Table I.  
Table 1. A detail description on the sources of data 
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*IDO- International Development Organization 
 
Interviews in Bangladesh were exclusively 
conducted in English, while the buyers’ home country 
language was used for interviews in Europe, except in one 
case where the English-speaking researcher was present at 
the meeting. Two of the authors spoke the buyers’ country 
language and all were fluent in English, so all the 
transcriptions could be prepared in English. Anonymity of 
the buyers and suppliers was promised and maintained 
throughout due to the sensitivity of the market situation. 
The semi-structured interviews covered CSR 
implementation, codes of conduct, working conditions, 
collaboration, development of trust and networks, CSR 
training, and the reputation of suppliers and buyers. To 
understand the role of context, representatives of the 
Dhaka Chamber of Commerce, one apparel employee 
training center, and the international development 
organization of the buyers’ country in Europe were 
interviewed both in Europe and Bangladesh. 
 The researchers visited eight factories producing 
clothes, fabrics and accessories and a number of 
institutions that influence the networks and relationships 
between the buyers and suppliers. Although factories were 
selected through our references, all of them had to be 
directly or indirectly connected to the buyers. Direct 
observations gave the researchers a real picture of CSR 
implementation relating to work environment, employee 
situations, codes of conduct, availability of information, 
process of learning and quality control. These sources 
were particularly beneficial to observe how control and 
trust were exercised in the workplace, as well as to 
compare the outcome of the discussions with the buyers 
and suppliers. Two workshops were organized, one in 
Bangladesh and the other in Europe, to get feedback from 
the academics and the experts on the outcome of the 
study. Newspaper coverage, particularly in the local 
country, complemented and also verified the collected 
data. The buyers’ websites were used as secondary source 
of data. Triangulation, which is highlighted in qualitative 
research, was ensured by combining different sources of 
data [12], [33]. The data were transcribed by both 
assistants and researchers to reduce any risk of error. The 
researchers made final corrections to avoid confusion.  
 
3.3        Analysis and validity   
 
In accordance with the aim of the study, a coding 
framework was first established with the aid of conceptual 
understanding. Following Ref. [4], transcripts were then 
dissected, classified and organized according to these 
codes for developing themes. Identifying themes involved 
a great deal of interpretative work observing as new 
themes emerged and evaluating how they matched with 
the old ones. As expected, control and trust were found as 
the main themes in understanding the process of managing 
CSR compliance in SC. The themes that appeared were 
categorized according to theoretical aspects and different 
links with the main themes could be identified. Thus, we 
found that informal control was related to collaboration 
and willingness to trust, while formal control was an 
essential element to develop competence trust. Analysis of 
the links between the themes led us to formulate a couple 
of propositions and draw conclusions on the CSR 
compliance in this study.   
For research validity, the authors took several 
measures. First, all the suppliers were approached through 
our own contacts, even though the buyers could have 
introduced the researchers to the suppliers. This helped to 
avoid any possible bias, because the suppliers were 
dependent on the buyers for orders. Second, the 
anonymity of the suppliers was maintained all along so 
that they could talk freely and describe the real situation. 
The researchers felt it was important to understand power-
trust issues between buyers and suppliers and how the 
CSR implementation process really proceeded. Third, 
primary and final results were presented in workshops, 
seminars, conferences and informal discussions with 
research colleagues and business people, as suggested by 
Ref. [37]. Managers responsible for CSR in the buyers’ 
and the suppliers’ companies were interviewed. Further 
other main partners involved in the SC CSR network were 
contacted and interviewed. These contacts gave us a 
comprehensive view of the SC network relationships 
related to CSR context. Fourth, the data was presented to 
key contact persons to ensure that researchers understood 
them correctly and to inform how data was used. 
 
4. The empirical study 
 
In this section the two buyers from the same European 
country are presented. The data used in the description 
comes mainly from the interviews but also from 
observations, buyer websites and newspaper articles 
covering issues in the apparel industry. 
 
4.1        The Alpha case 
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4.1.1     Background  
 
Alpha is a leading European apparel buyer with a sales 
volume of US $20.8 billion in 2014. It has more than 2700 
stores around the world and employs more than 72,000 
people. It does not own any factory but outsources its 
production to independent suppliers, mainly in Asia and 
Europe, through local offices. In Bangladesh, 350 people 
work in design, quality control, purchasing and CSR. 
Factories that supply Alpha are required to be fully 
compliant with the buyer’s codes of conduct; regular 
audits to assess their level of compliance are carried out 
by the use of full audit program. The code, developed to 
follow international standards, covers seven issues: legal 
requirements, a ban on child labor, health and safety, 
workers’ rights, housing conditions, environment and 
systems approach. Codes relating to child labor, health 
and safety, and worker’s rights are particularly 
emphasized in the compliance agenda, which must be 
fulfilled at the suppliers’ factories. The buyer tries to be 
clear about what it wants from suppliers on CSR issues 
and thoroughly applies a zero-tolerance principle. Alpha 
states that: 
 
Code of compliance determines which suppliers can 
and cannot be used and can also play a role in 
defining order quantities placed with certain 
suppliers. We clearly inform suppliers about the 
business risks that can result from noncompliance 
and seek to educate them and support their 
development.              
(Alpha website, accessed July 3, 2013) 
 
4.1.2     Supplier selection and CSR compliance  
 
In 2012, Alpha had 250 suppliers as business partners. 
The suppliers are grouped into three categories depending 
on the degree of CSR compliance achieved. The first 
category suppliers enjoy trust from Alpha as long-term 
partners and usually undergo routine controls. This group 
gets regular orders and support with training and other 
resources to work towards 100% compliance. The second 
and third categories go through strict scrutiny, including 
announced and unannounced audits. Alpha puts costly 
resources into control activities to maintain its reputation 
in the local and world markets. All CSR categories need to 
improve, and there is a specific plan for improvements. If 
a fault is detected, the supplier is given one month to fix 
it; during this time, no new order is placed with the 
company.  
Suppliers who show strong improvement in terms of 
business performance and code of conduct compliance are 
rewarded with regular or higher order volumes. A supplier 
is not allowed to continue if the company fails to rectify 
the faults within stipulated time. One first-category 
supplier was denied orders for failing to meet set 
requirements, and gradually the supplier went out of 
business because Alpha was their main customer. Alpha 
claims to offer reasonable time to the supplier to resolve 
the issue if the code requirements are not achieved.  
If the first-supplier needs to subcontract to meet an 
acute demand, the company is only allowed to place an 
order with Alpha-nominated subcontractors accepted by 
Alpha. Accessory suppliers like fabric manufacturers and 
zipper factories need to follow the buyer’s codes. As 
fabrics are mainly procured from the local suppliers, it 
becomes easy for Alpha to check and accept the quality of 
the products and to observe whether second-tier suppliers 
work according to the code for SC compliance. 
When a new supplier is recruited Alpha visits the 
factory to gather initial information on the company’s 
capacity, need of resources, management and CSR 
practices. If satisfied, the buyer makes an unannounced 
visit, and goes through CSR documents with management 
and meet the workers. Every supplier needs to have a 
correction plan for each deficiency. Three follow-up visits 
are made to the factory, and the whole process takes four 
to nine months. It is a joint effort between Alpha and the 
supplier, involving a substantial resource base comprising 
manpower, competence, experience, time, willingness and 
mutual understanding. 
It was observed during the factory visits that 
communication with the suppliers may be a one-way 
process. However Alpha has regular dialog particularly 
with the first-tier suppliers on the issues of quality control, 
codes of conduct, order placement and engaging 
subcontractors when the order volume increases. The CSR 
manager of Alpha describes the process: 
 
It is a transparent system. They know what we want 
them to do and what the consequence could be if 
things go wrong. We have a capacity department to 
assess the total need and sustainability auditors to 
scrutinize the suppliers’ activities and CSR 
performance. 
 
One first-supplier expresses satisfaction with its 
relationship with Alpha. They have signed contract with 
the buyer that will last several years. This supplier feels 
that CSR guidelines are helpful to plan their activities and 
to achieve compliance with the requirements. The 
expertise of Alpha helps in developing the competence to 
handle CSR issues. Alpha personnel not only give 
instructions but follow up recommendations to ensure that 
the factory employees understand the requirements and 
carry out the functions as outlined. Clear codes of conduct 
serve as important documents for relying on Alpha’s 
competence as a solid buyer. The issue of compliance has 
been crucial in building its relationship with Alpha and to 
increase the supply of apparel. 
Alpha finds that middle management, which is 
responsible for CSR implementation in the factories, lacks 
CSR understanding and competence. These are often 
promoted from a lower level, and lack understanding of 
the importance of the buyer’s code of conduct. This issue 
has made Alpha uncertain about the performance of 
certain suppliers. Another sensitive area is the use of 
second-tier suppliers when first-tier suppliers outsource. 
Alpha wants control over these suppliers to be sure that 
the codes of conduct are followed. The first-tier supplier 
sees the recruitment of business graduates to the factories 
as problematic, as they are more interested in working at 
the corporate level. There is a gap between what the buyer 
wants and what the suppliers can deliver. A functional 
network of actors consisting of local universities, the 
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garment industry association, a government 
representative, buyers and suppliers is largely missing to 
handle the educational shortage on CSR issues. One 
supplier stated: 
The buyers do not always understand the suppliers’ 
situation, as they have limited resources; they work 
within a short time framework; they have to strictly 
implement the code of conduct and also maintain the 
delivery time. All these activities need to be 
coordinated and supported. 
 
4.1.3     Networking 
 
A buyer not only depends on the fabric suppliers but also 
must be aware of the CSR activities of other actors in the 
supply chain. The major Bangladesh incident in 2013 
affected the whole SC, including apparel suppliers, 
accessory suppliers and logistics companies, since the 
buyer slowed down the procurement of goods from 
Bangladesh to avoid antagonizing the final customers in 
the Western world. The Bangladesh Garment 
Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA) is 
closely linked with local suppliers to ensure that local 
labor laws are respected and followed. The Dhaka 
Chamber of Commerce, an extension of the government, 
has no direct contact with the suppliers but works closely 
with BGMEA. One important role of BGMEA is to deal 
with media and other local and international contacts on 
behalf of the suppliers.  
A Buyers’ Forum was initiated in 2006 by Alpha, 
along with a number of international buyers. A World 
Bank organization also collaborates with the Forum, 
which functions as a meeting place for around 20 brands 
to discuss topics such as workers’ rights issues and local 
labor laws, to find consensus among their viewpoints. 
Alpha is involved in many CSR projects with local and 
foreign actors to develop better working conditions for 
apparel workers. In 2011, Alpha’s managing director met 
the prime minister of Bangladesh to discuss the wages of 
apparel workers and directly worked with the BGMEA to 
improve the overall SC situation. The government and the 
association put pressure on Alpha to make direct 
contributions to improving security and other standards of 
the factories, rather than only continuing with control 
measures. The interacting parties understand that 
employees must be educated to follow CSR effectively, 
but there are no concrete programs arranged to do this. 
The buyer considers it a responsibility of the suppliers. 
The chamber of commerce offers training programs on 
CSR practices, but so far neither the buyer nor its 
suppliers have utilized them. 
Alpha has run a training school for young people 
from slum areas for several years. The youths gain both 
vocational training and insight into the codes of conduct. 
After the completion of their education, trainees can get 
employment in the suppliers’ factories. The trainees bring 
fresh knowledge of CSR practices to the factories and can 
be a source of inspiration for the existing employees to 
follow the guidelines. Alpha’s network is presented in 
Figure 2. First-tier suppliers collaborate with second-tier 
suppliers and accessory suppliers like zipper, plastic and 
fabrics manufacturers. Alpha is very careful with the 
quality of fabrics, so it maintains direct contact with the 
fabrics manufacturers. The chamber of commerce has 
little contact with suppliers but collaborates with the 
garment industry association, which sharpened its control 
over the supplier factories after recent accidents. 
 
  
Figure 2.  Network of Alpha showing the actors and 
the flow of control and trust in the relationship 
 
4.2        The Beta case 
 
4.2.1 Background 
 
Beta is a smaller European fashion chain with 400 stores 
and 4500 employees in Europe. Sales were US $558 
million in the financial year 2013-2014. Beta’s business 
concept is to offer affordable fashion with wide appeal by 
applying a sustainable approach through the entire product 
flow, from design and production to transport and 
warehouse and into the store. Beta has almost 35 suppliers 
in Bangladesh and places its work with around 50 
factories. It procures 25% of the supplies from the local 
market. Compared to the other buyers, Beta procures only 
0.4% of the country’s total apparel exports. 
 
4.2.2 Supplier selection and CSR compliance 
 
Beta’s supplier selection process starts when the 
company’s personnel visit the factory to see whether it 
fulfills basic code of conduct requirements, including 
safety, fire alarms, no child labor, freedom of association, 
no harassment, no discrimination and availability of clean 
drinking water. Beta does not see much difficulty with the 
quality of products, price or lead time with local suppliers. 
Most attention is paid to safety issue. Gender equality, 
salary, health care and sanitary facilities are also on their 
agenda. This buyer applies a “business partner” concept, 
based on collaboration, freedom of work and trust. It has a 
program to develop “key suppliers” to ensure good 
quality, to maintain a delivery schedule and to resolve 
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CSR-related problems quickly. In general, Beta follows a 
liberal policy to develop its suppliers: 
 
We tell our suppliers to make an action plan. We 
don’t really say how they will do it or when they will 
start. We tell them what to do and want them to tell 
us how they will fix the problems. The suppliers work 
with less stress as we don’t push them towards a 
deadline. 
  
    (CSR Manager, Asia) 
 
When it comes to audits, Beta largely relies on the 
suppliers who have been its business partners for some 
time. Beta claims to know what their suppliers are doing 
and encourages them to improve compliance with codes 
of conduct. Suppliers carry out internal audits, and third-
party auditors are used as well as the buyer’s own 
auditors. As a comparatively smaller player, Beta 
considers that it has limited resources to monitor second-
tier suppliers. At peak times, the suppliers seek sub-
suppliers to meet the demands of huge numbers of buyers. 
As a rule, a main supplier subcontracts up to 10% of the 
total amount of a big contract.  
The second-tier supplier is considered as a part of the 
first-tier; therefore, all activities from quality control to 
implementation of CSR practices are responsibilities of 
the main supplier. It makes the buyer dependent on the 
first-tier supplier, because transferring control to them 
with low insight into this process. If something goes 
wrong, Beta contacts the first-tier supplier to rectify the 
shortcomings but has little influence in the short run for 
improvements. 
Beta’s policy is not to interfere in the main suppliers’ 
area of activity. The buyer is involved when suppliers ask 
for support or advice, particularly in relation to CSR 
implementation. When second-tier suppliers are used, the 
first-tier supplier is, however, asked to evaluate them and 
inform about their CSR practices. The buyer is trying to 
minimize the use of second-tier suppliers to guarantee 
CSR compliance. Trust is vital at this stage, since the 
buyer lacks resources to monitor the suppliers’ and 
subcontractors’ activities, particularly relating to security 
and employee welfare issues. Beta mentions that suppliers 
face delivery time pressure when several buyers place 
orders and forcing them to give larger buyers precedence. 
Beta is looking for key suppliers, building on trust and 
close relationships. This project is under development and 
it has not been successful finding partners for long-term 
collaboration. One explanation is that it is a small buyer 
with less influence on the local business context. Beta 
supports the suppliers through training, guidance in 
implementing codes of conduct, and continuous dialog in 
solving supply-related problems. 
Beta identifies middle management as the major 
source of problems for CSR compliance. Primarily, the 
mind-set of managers must be changed to understand the 
importance of CSR. Beta feels that the situation could be 
improved by recruiting business students, who would 
bring knowledge of CSR standards and practices to the 
apparel industry. Beta provides some training to 
employees but more resources are required to implement 
CSR in supplier organizations.  
 
 
4.2.3 Networking  
 
This buyer collaborates with different companies in the 
Buyers’ Forum, where it confers on a variety of business 
issues, particularly CSR practices and how to deal with 
the basic requirements of the codes of conduct. Beta has 
tried to collaborate with large buyers but works better with 
similar-sized firms on long-term projects. Beta’s contact 
with the multinational’s home country development 
agency is mutual, as both focuses on capacity 
development of the suppliers. The company is engaged in 
collaborative projects with other fashion chains to 
guarantee sustainably cultivated cotton and participates in 
Business for Social Responsibility (www.bsr.org), a 
global, nonprofit organization that works for ethics and 
the environment. In 2013, Beta joined other buyers, trade 
unions and labor organizations to ensure a secure and safe 
working environment in the garment industry. Beta’s 
network is presented in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Network of Beta showing the actors and the 
flow of control and trust in the relationship 
 
Unlike most buyers, Beta is not a member of the 
Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI), a Europe-
based organization. This organization offers support to 
buyers in the form of control. Beta’s strategy is, however, 
to develop close collaboration and trust with suppliers. 
The CSR manager for Asia has a clear opinion on the 
issue: 
 
We are not looking for complaining about the 
suppliers but willingness to solve problems through 
collaboration and understanding. We don’t put effort 
into auditing, policing and raising tough 
requirements which suppliers have difficulty in 
complying with. We like to be their partners and 
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support them all the way to maintain a good working 
environment in the organization. 
 
Beta has developed video films showing the 
necessity and explaining how CSR practices can be 
applied in the supplier organizations. Collaboration with 
the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters 
Association (BGMEA) is important to distribute these 
films to the appropriate suppliers. Beta receives feedback 
from the association and discusses with other buyers how 
to further improve the standards of the supplier factories. 
Beta is also running its own school for vulnerable women 
ages 18 and above to offer vocational training. The 
training covers technical aspects of the work, quality 
control and basic issues relating to codes of conduct. The 
school is run together with suppliers and a local NGO. 
Beta recognizes that it has limited resources but is also 
under pressure from the local community to upgrade the 
safety situation. In this regard it works with many actors, 
including small buyers, suppliers, the garment industry 
association and the chamber of commerce. The process is 
described as follows: 
We have limited control over the situation as the 
network is broad, and a lot of things have to be done 
to make the CSR practices more effective. I realize, 
this is a never-ending process. You need to carry on 
and come back again and again to see how things 
work. 
 
(CSR Manager, Asia) 
 
4.3        Case comparison 
 
Company size makes a major distinction between the 
buyers to manage CSR supplier compliance. Alpha has a 
strong base in the local market with major contacts within 
and outside SCs. This buyer take part in different 
activities for mobilizing resources to act for the 
improvement of codes of conduct. The buyer has been 
actively involved in increasing employee salaries and also 
taking part in the delegation sent to the highest level of 
the government. Beta has been involved in CSR 
improvement activities in the country but mainly 
concentrated on dealing with the main suppliers. The two 
cases is presented and compared in Table II, following the 
constructs of the theoretical framework.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Case comparison 
 
 
In the areas of trust and control, the buyers were 
found to differ most. Beta from the beginning was focused 
on a trusting relationship with the suppliers for CSR 
compliance. It played an advisory role and was not found 
to take a stiff stand against the suppliers, failing to fulfill 
the code of conduct requirements. Beta even relied on the 
first-tier suppliers in connection to the performance of the 
second-tier suppliers. It might happen that this buyer had 
little resources to keep contact with the second-tier 
suppliers. For Alpha, strict control was a central issue for 
CSR compliance. Creating different supplier categories 
was an attempt to secure control and had been directly 
linked to a reward-punishment strategy. This large buyer 
was not ready to take any risk considering its substantial 
role in the local and global market. It had some trust for 
the first category of suppliers, but zero tolerance was 
applicable to all. Even second-tier suppliers came under 
Alpha’s direct scrutiny, showing its eagerness to 
implement codes of conduct throughout the SCs in the 
local market.  
Another distinction was Alpha’s expectation that the 
suppliers would carry out compliance activities with their 
own resources. The small buyer was willing to support the 
suppliers, but ran short of resources to fulfill the 
commitments. The suppliers in this case were expected to 
conduct internal auditing, while the large buyer conducted 
almost all auditing. Furthermore, Alpha looked for 
suppliers’ competence while Beta relied more on the 
suppliers’ intent for collaboration. Alpha put pressure on 
the suppliers for gradual improvement to reach total 
compliance, but no such clear ambition was found with 
Beta.  
The major similarity between the cases is the 
absence of qualified middle management. Unless this 
group is capable and understands the need of CSR, it 
seems difficult for the suppliers to make substantial 
improvement in CSR compliance. A change of mind-set is 
therefore necessary at least at this level to bring changes 
in SCs. Capacity building was done in a limited way 
through vocational training and some education. Both 
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partners approached the suppliers to motivate them for 
CSR compliance, but in different ways. 
 
5. Discussion  
 
5.1        Overview 
 
The principal actors in this study are two European buyers 
and their main suppliers. The buyers concentrate on 
developing relationships with the main suppliers for 
procuring apparel and ensuring that codes of conduct are 
followed to support employee well-being. The CSR 
activities include issues like health and safety, workers’ 
rights, the abuse of child labor, legal requirements to 
follow and improvements to the work environment. The 
buyers carry out various forms of audits, depending 
mainly on the firm’s ability and availability of resources. 
The large buyer, Alpha, is capable of conducting 
comprehensive audits at different supplier tiers, while the 
small buyer, Beta, with limited resources, has to be 
satisfied in collaboration with the main supplier and 
leaving the responsibility for the second tier to the latter.  
 The suppliers have been interested in getting regular 
contracts and support in capacity development for 
compliance. In one case, suppliers receive thorough 
guidelines and codes of conduct for managing CSR 
compliance independently. In the other case, suppliers are 
treated as partners and some joint efforts are made for 
capacity development and compliance. Indirect contacts 
with other suppliers are part of the purchasing process, 
particularly for the smaller buyer, confirming Ref. [27]’s 
argument that business relationships are not limited to 
direct contact. 
This study shows that compliance development 
needs support by other actors in the SC, which is called 
secondary functions in the SC. Relationships with 
different actors such as the government, the garment 
industry association and the chamber of commerce, as 
well as for collaboration with other buyers and running 
schools for vocational training, are continuously 
reinforced and maintained from a long-term perspective. 
This is in line with Ref. [50], who identify the increased 
use of intra-functional, cross-functional and inter-
organizational coordination in the SC. The buyers engage 
in the network depending on the extent of their businesses 
and the resources they possess. The small buyer has 
contact with actors of equivalent sizes. In contrast, the 
large buyer is a major player in the market, having contact 
with bigger buyers and policy makers in the local country. 
By its initiative, it has developed several collaborative 
projects to support compliance activities and capacity 
development efforts.  
 
5.2   Control, trust, compliance and capacity 
development  
 
Both buyers see it important that CSR compliance is 
carried out in the supplier organizations by capacity 
building and competence development. However, to reach 
that aim, the buyers follow two different strategies. The 
large buyer, for example, approaches compliance through 
formal control expressed in codes of conduct, announced 
and unannounced audits, zero tolerance and pressure for 
continuous improvement of CSR performance, as 
described by Ref. [19]. The suppliers are expected to have 
the competence to do the work. The large buyer 
particularly stresses the need for a long-term relationship 
with the first-tier suppliers on the basis of good 
performance and compliance with CSR requirements. It 
invests vital resources and engages in activities with 
different SC actors to ensure a risk-free supply from the 
local market.  
To develop competence and capacity in its suppliers, 
the large buyer has developed several tools such as 
guidelines for upgrading, support and inspection at the 
suppliers’ sites, providing vocational training and 
education, building the buyers’ forum to learn from other 
buyers in dealing with security and safety issues, and 
collaborating with local authorities to ease suppliers’ 
compliance activity. The main supplier takes this support 
positively and relies on the competence of the buyer. 
Confidence earned through competence has been labeled 
competence trust by Ref. [41]. The strategy is twofold 
here: both control and trust are applied to the first-tier 
suppliers, but only control is exercised in the case of 
second- and third-tier suppliers.  
The small buyer, on the other hand, has focused from 
the beginning on trust with suppliers in the belief that 
CSR implementation will take place through dialog. This 
buyer plays an advisory role and motivates first-tier 
suppliers for capacity building to comply with codes of 
conduct. Work-related factors, particularly factory 
security and health conditions, are important issues for the 
buyer. The practice here is to rely on first-tier suppliers for 
monitoring the performance of the second tier, as was also 
witnessed by Ref. [34] in their study.  
In fact, the small buyer has little contact with its 
second-tier suppliers and is only in touch with them if 
something goes wrong. This has also made the buyer 
dependent on the local partner creating joint control in the 
SC. The control mechanism is an informal arrangement 
and is seen to be based on good intention and faith, 
particularly by the small buyer. Intentional trust, as 
outlined by Ref. [41], is practiced partly to minimize the 
cost of auditing and partly to create an atmosphere of 
collaboration. But the outcome has not been good, due to 
the absence of clear instructions and inability of the buyer 
to exercise control over the SC. The suppliers’ problem 
has been competence and capacity, since small buyers 
mostly have to depend on less qualified suppliers. As a 
minor actor, the small buyer faces uncertainty in the 
timely delivery of goods and developing key relationships 
with solid partners. The buyer has neither resources nor a 
strong position to fully develop and control the quality of 
CSR implementation in the supplier factories. 
 
 
 5.3        Control-trust framework 
 
From the above discussion, a framework of two 
mechanisms in managing CSR compliance in SCs can be 
identified (Figure 4). These mechanisms are quite extreme 
and either based on control or trust. Networking was 
found to be a supporting element in the buyer-supplier 
relationship rather than acting as an influencer. The 
control mechanism relies on exercising pure control by 
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focusing on concrete outcomes and competence in the SC. 
In this case, capacity building is considered to be a normal 
function of the supplier, which cannot expect much 
support from the buyer. The trust mechanism, on the other 
hand, rests on good faith and consists of less clear 
objectives from the buyer for the supplier to attain. In this 
case, control is weak and informal, and the intention of 
collaboration and developing intentional trust between the 
buyers and suppliers are emphasized to support capacity 
building efforts. For CSR compliance, capacity building is 
considered as a joint function of the buyers and suppliers. 
This study, however, indicates that the concept of joint 
effort cannot work unless better suppliers can be hired and 
the buyer can mobilize sufficient resources to supervise 
the supply chain. 
 
Figure 4. Applied CSR compliance framework 
 
To summarize, the two case companies apply control and 
trust as isolated tools, making suppliers either totally 
dependent on or independent of the buyers. In the control-
driven strategy, one-way communication dominates and 
does not help to develop a relationship based on dialog 
and collaboration. Along with competence trust, it may be 
necessary to allow for developing intentional trust in the 
relationship. In the trust-driven strategy, it is important 
that competence trust is stressed and that important 
functions are regularly supervised. Following Ref. [51], 
we argue that depending on the buyer’s strategy, some 
combination of control and trust is necessary in CSR 
compliance management. We can now formulate two 
propositions: 
 
P1: A control-driven strategy requires intentional trust and 
joint participation in capacity building for effective 
management of CSR compliance in the SC. 
P2: A trust-driven strategy requires competence trust and 
some formal control for effective management of CSR 
compliance in the SC. 
 
6.          Conclusions 
 
Buyers’ management of CSR compliance in supplier 
organizations addresses three interrelated issues that this 
study has examined:  
 
(a) synchronizing control and trust to manage CSR 
compliance in the SC 
(b) creating interaction between buyer and supplier 
for CSR compliance in the SC 
(c) developing buyer-supplier interaction with other 
actors who can influence CSR compliance in the 
SC  
  
The first issue is the focus of the study, while the 
other issues are complementary. This study fills an 
important gap in SC theory on relationships by stressing 
how control and trust interact and complement each other 
in managing CSR compliance. It shows that control and 
trust are important but seldom used together for CSR 
compliance. However, classifying control and trust into 
subcategories offers a tool for integrating and balancing 
trust and control to ensure smooth operation of SCs. The 
degree of interaction between buyers and suppliers is 
found to depend on the need and capacity of the buyers. 
The large buyer knows what it expects from the 
interactions with suppliers, while the small buyer’s aim 
from the interactions is quite diffused. Networking with 
other actors has been found helpful and seems to have 
both direct and indirect impact on the management of 
CSR compliance.  
One important conclusion is that the large buyer 
exercises control to create trust, while the small buyer 
with limited resources depends on trust to secure control. 
The positive part of strict control is that the message is 
made clear to the whole SC and everyone knows the rules 
of the game. Buyer competence helps to develop overall 
SC competence, trust and long-term relationships with 
suppliers. The large buyer thus to some extent displays 
how trust and control can be combined to manage CSR. 
Wide contact networks and buyer resources in the SC 
were found to have a positive impact on the local market. 
Association with a resourceful buyer helps suppliers come 
in contact with other global buyers and gain further 
business. The first case shows that exercise of successful 
control breeds trust and not the other way around, 
confirming the observation of Ref. [8]. 
 Another conclusion is that capacity development 
needs to be ensured for managing CSR compliance as a 
continuous process. This means that managerial 
competence requires support from the whole organization 
and employees to result in successful compliance. 
Therefore, capacity supplements the CSR process, not 
replacing compliance, which Ref. [12] claim.  
 A further reflection relates to the network 
perspective, which considers control and trust as a part of 
networking. We also see some interconnectedness 
between these issues but in a different way. In CSR 
compliance management, it seems more relevant to look at 
how control and trust form networks, rather than starting 
from the network to identify control and trust. The need 
for control in SC is probably an important issue; the buyer 
must decide which type of network it finds suitable or 
which contacts it wants to develop for ensuring 
compliance. 
  
6.1        Theoretical and practical implications 
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Linking network and inter-organizational literature, this 
study analyzes control and trust in regard to management 
of CSR compliance in the SC. This research fills an 
important gap in SC theory on relationships by stressing 
how control and trust can interact and complement each 
other in the compliance process. It also shows how control 
and trust can be classified into subcategories and 
interlinked. Further, the role of context and its impact is 
discussed to better understand the buyer-supplier 
relationship and the role of other actors on the functioning 
of the relationship. This issue needs further inquiry. 
Finally, safety and working conditions, which are usually 
left out of CSR discussions, are particularly stressed and 
linked with the SC literature. 
 This research has several implications for 
practitioners. First, full control can work in the short run, 
but for total compliance, managers may need to develop a 
balanced combination of control and trust in the buyer-
supplier relationship. Second, blind trust is seen to have a 
negative result in the management of CSR compliance. 
We acknowledge that willingness to collaborate is 
essential, but certain prerequisites, including supplier 
competence and managerial resources in the SC, are 
needed if collaboration is to be sustained. Intentional trust 
is prone to fail when the mutual expectations in the buyer-
supplier relationship are not met.  
Third, managers need to use both formal and 
informal control to create competence and intentional trust 
in the SC. Using only formal control is less dynamic and 
can negatively affect the buyer-supplier relationship. 
Finally, capacity building needs to be seen as a 
complement, not an alternative to CSR compliance. This 
confers an important responsibility to the buyers for 
extending support to the suppliers for doing a good job. A 
strong buyer can show willingness to share ideas with the 
serious suppliers to come up with long-lasting 
relationships. To solve any middle management 
recruitment problem, suppliers can improve their industry 
image by offering attractive benefit packages and 
highlighting their close associations with foreign buyers. 
Suppliers will gain a lot if they have CSR-competent staff, 
while buyers will save money and time on monitoring 
CSR compliance in their SCs. 
 
6.2   Limitations and suggestions for further 
research 
 
A comparative study between just two firms to analyze the 
CSR compliance process is inadequate, although it gives 
some understanding of the situation. A further study 
involving several buyers could give more insight into the 
challenges in managing CSR compliance in the SC. 
Another limitation is the focus on one country, which 
makes generalization difficult. Buyers from different 
countries in the apparel industry could be included in 
future research to reflect on the variation of buying 
strategies applied by different firms. This study dealt with 
competence trust and intentional trust and examined their 
relationship to formal and informal control, which is new 
in studying CSR implementation. To gain deeper insight 
into the issues and the impact on the overall SC, it is 
necessary to examine several cases. Although compliance 
and capacity building are complementary, this study has 
not properly investigated the links between the concepts. 
A future study would be able to highlight the importance 
of this complementary relationship, investigate the gaps 
and suggest what could be done in the SCs to ensure 
capacity building and CSR compliance in the apparel 
industry. A further study on how networks influence CSR 
compliance is necessary, as this study partly focused on 
how buyers and suppliers are connected with external 
actors.  
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